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WHY IS ASEAN DIPLOMACY
CHANGING?




A conventional/rationalist explanation holds that the ASEAN countries have
begun to have open and frank discussions in order to deal with new chal-
lenges, such as economic and environmental issues, in an efficient way.  Con-
structivists explain ASEAN’s change by focusing on the global normative shift,
which emphasizes human rights and democracy.
Introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
has been changing in recent years.  In their annual ministerial meetings and
other settings, Southeast Asian countries are beginning to discuss issues of
common concern in a relatively open and frank manner.  Such candid discus-
sions have the potential to contravene ASEAN’s traditional diplomatic
norms.  The ASEAN countries, in particular the five original members,1 for
decades have been practicing a set of unique diplomatic norms—the
“ASEAN Way”—whose elements include the principles of non-interference
in the internal affairs of other states.  The ASEAN Way encourages the
Hiro Katsumata is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.  He wishes to thank an
anonymous reviewer for his/her constructive comments.
Asian Survey, 44:2, pp. 237–254.  ISSN: 0004–4687 R
 2004 by The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California
Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223.
1. ASEAN’s original members are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philip-
pines.  Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and finally, in 1999,
Cambodia became the 10th member.
237
\\server05\productn\A\ASR\44-2\ASR202.txt unknown Seq: 2 28-APR-04 10:11
238 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2004
Southeast Asian countries to seek an informal and incremental approach to
cooperation through lengthy consultation and dialogue.  The “comfort level”
of members is an important precondition for ASEAN’s multilateral diplo-
macy, and members, for decades, have been pursuing dialogue without criti-
cizing each other in public.
However, in recent years member states have distanced themselves from
strict adherence to the ASEAN Way.  The Thai proposal for “flexible engage-
ment” in 1998 was one of the starting points of the recent change in ASEAN
diplomacy.  In July 1998, then-Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan pro-
posed that ASEAN adopt a policy of flexible engagement, which involves
discussions of fellow members’ domestic policies.  He held that issues affect-
ing each other might be brought up and discussed by ASEAN members, with-
out this being perceived as interference.2  The Thai Foreign Ministry
maintained that flexible engagement would not violate the principle of non-
interference.3  However, it was significant that Bangkok called for a modified
interpretation of what counts as interference in the domestic affairs of
ASEAN members.  The Thai proposal itself was not supported by other
members, except for the Philippines.  Nevertheless, debate over the interpre-
tation of the principle of non-interference has continued.
Today, ASEAN has a framework called “Retreats,” in which matters of
common concern are discussed frankly.  The ministers held their first Retreat
in July 1999 when they met for their regular annual meeting.  They held
another, separate from their regular annual meeting, in April 2001, and met
again in July.  The ministers had frank discussions on various issues such as
regional security, intra- and inter-regional cooperation, and the future direc-
tion of ASEAN.4  In the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) in 2002, the
foreign ministers “reaffirmed the usefulness of informal, open and frank dia-
logue . . . to address issues of common concern to the region.”5  It is safe to
say that the traditional diplomatic manner of ASEAN has been challenged,
and ASEAN diplomacy has been changing.  The principle of non-interference
has been interpreted in a more flexible way.
Why has this happened?  Why has ASEAN diplomacy been changing?
This is the key question to be explored in this article.  To answer it, two
supplemental problems are involved.  First, this research should address why
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, “Press Briefing by H. E. Foreign Minister on Flexi-
ble Engagement, at Manila Hotel, Manila,” Press Release no. 705/2541, July 24, 1998.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, “Thailand’s Non-Paper on the Flexible Engagement
Approach,” Press Release no.  743/2541, July 27, 1998.
4. ASEAN, “Joint Communique´, the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,” Hanoi, July 23–24,
2001.
5. ASEAN, “Joint Communique´, the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,” Bandar Seri
Begawan, Brunei, July 29–30, 2002.
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it was in the late 1990s that ASEAN diplomacy began to change.  Second,
this study should also address the question of why some of the members have
promoted a flexible interpretation of the non-interference principle, while
others are rather reluctant to modify the ASEAN Way of diplomacy.  Thai-
land and the Philippines have advocated changes in ASEAN’s traditional dip-
lomatic style.  Bangkok and Manila called for a policy of flexible engage-
ment in the late 1990s.  In contrast, among the original ASEAN members,
Indonesia and Malaysia have been strong supporters of the traditional way.
New ASEAN members in the 1990s such as Vietnam and Myanmar are also
reluctant to change the interpretation of the ASEAN Way.  Any explanation
for ASEAN’s change should address the question of the difference within
ASEAN.
In order to address these questions, this article considers the plausibility of
a conventional explanation that is supported by many authors.  Such an ex-
planation is in line with a rationalist perspective in international relations
(IR).  It holds that the recent change is ASEAN’s attempt to deal efficiently
with various new challenges, including environmental problems, economic
disruption, terrorism, drugs, and transnational crimes.  These issues require a
collective response; thus the open and frank discussions occur.
This study reveals some limitations of this line of argument, while not
completely rejecting its validity.  The study attempts to offer an alternative
account by taking a constructivist perspective.  Today, the main debate in IR
is between constructivists and rationalists,6 and in this article, the former are
shown attempting to challenge the latter in the case of ASEAN diplomacy.
Constructivism is broad in an epistemological sense, and contains many
strands.  The strand of constructivism employed in this study is the one that
takes a similar epistemological stance to those in rationalist IR approaches,
including neoliberalism and neorealism.  This is because this kind of con-
structivism, like the rationalist approaches, seeks to explain events in the real
world,7 and the aim of this study is to offer a sound explanation for the recent
change in ASEAN’s diplomacy.
The first and second sections of this article deal with the conventional/
rationalist and constructivist explanations, respectively.  These sections ex-
6. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organiza-
tion and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), pp.
645–85.  See also Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualising
Security in the Last Twenty Years,” in Critical Reflections on Security and Change, eds. Stuart
Croft and Terry Terriff (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 76.
7. This kind of constructivism is supported by such authors as Peter Katzenstein and Alexan-
der Wendt.  See Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), and Alexander Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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plore how each perspective addresses the research questions above.  The con-
cluding section summarizes the argument and explores the possibilities of an
eclectic view.
Conventional/Rationalist Explanation
In today’s international relations, rationalist approaches hold a dominant po-
sition.  Among various strands of rationalism, the most common one in IR
assumes that actors pursue their own interests instrumentally and rationally.
In such a perspective, international relations are seen as efficient and as fol-
lowing a course which leads inexorably and relatively quickly to a unique
equilibrium.8  Actors’ actions are seen as driven by a logic of consequences,
as opposed to a logic of appropriateness.9  This rationalist perspective may be
useful for explaining ASEAN diplomacy.  What can be regarded as a conven-
tional explanation for ASEAN’s recent change is in line with this perspective.
The conventional/rationalist explanation holds that the recent change in
ASEAN’s diplomacy is the member countries’ attempt to deal efficiently
with new challenges.  These include environmental issues, the pollution haze
problem, economic disruption, illegal migration, terrorism, drugs, and trans-
national crime.  While traditional issues such as national security (defined
mainly in militaristic terms) may be addressed individually by each member,
these non-traditional issues require a multilateral response achieved through
policy coordination.  An inadequate response by one member can cause dam-
age to neighboring countries or to the whole Southeast Asian region.  This is
why frank discussions among the ASEAN members have become necessary.
Members have begun to have open and frank discussions in order to deal with
these new challenges efficiently.
Why the Late 1990s?
The conventional/rationalist explanation can address the question of why
ASEAN began to change in recent years—i.e., in the late 1990s—when
member countries faced two major non-traditional challenges.  One was the
financial crisis that erupted in 1997, which caused damage to most Southeast
Asian countries.  The other challenge is the environmental problem caused by
the Indonesian pollution haze in 1997, which affected Singapore, Malaysia,
Brunei, and the southern part of the Philippines.  The burning of forests by
8. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International
Political Orders,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 954–57.
9. While the latter perspective sees actions as rule-oriented, in the former perspective, actions
are driven by calculation of their consequences as measured against prior preferences or inter-
ests, which are seen as exogenous and stable.  Ibid., pp. 949–51; and James G. March and Johan
P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free
Press, 1989).
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Indonesian industries to create plantations severely damaged the well-being
of people in neighboring countries.
For proponents of this explanation, it is understandable why the ASEAN
countries began in the late 1990s to move toward promoting frank discussion
and modifying the interpretation of the non-interference principle.  Efficient
responses to these challenges required collective endeavors, which often in-
volved discussions of each country’s domestic issues.  Simon Tay and Jesus
Estanislao argue that in ASEAN, “The strict adherence to the principle of
non-interference . . . has been softened and dented,” and that “in a number of
areas, there has been some evolution . . . toward reforms.”  Their focus is on
the recent economic and environmental crises:
In response to the economic crisis . . . the ASEAN countries began a process to
exchange financial information and review as well as comment on such informa-
tion . . . with increasing levels of frankness. . . . There have also been changes to
the ASEAN Way of doing things in response to the environmental crisis caused by
the Indonesian fires and haze . . . [The meetings of senior environmental officials]
have become the occasion for a more open and frank discussion.10
Herman Kraft emphasizes the transboundary implications of the environmen-
tal and economic issues in his discussion of the Thai proposal for flexibility.
The haze issue could not be considered as a purely internal matter for Indone-
sia, considering its transboundary effects.  For Kraft, similarly with the haze
case, the financial crisis “showed the importance of reconsidering non-inter-
vention on issues that have transboundary implications.”11
Furthermore, it is notable that many scholars advocate modifying the inter-
pretation of the principle of non-interference, while stressing the need for
ASEAN to deal with its new challenges.  Tay and Estanislao argue that ex-
ceptions must be found with regard to the principles of the ASEAN Way.12
Jusuf Wanandi notes that the principle of non-intervention is now “passe´”:
Many of the old principles on which ASEAN has functioned for the last thirty
years are no longer adequate . . . For example, the informal style of co-operation
. . . has proved inadequate. . . . Domestic problems such as the financial crisis,
drug-trafficking, environmental hazards, migration problems, transnational crimes
. . . are regional problems.  They call for regional . . . co-operation and solutions.13
10. Simon S. C. Tay and Jesus P. Estanislao, “The Relevance of ASEAN Crisis and Change,”
in Reinventing ASEAN, eds. Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, and Hadi Soesastro (Singa-
pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), pp. 11–12.
11. Herman Kraft, The Principle of Non-intervention and ASEAN: Evolution and Emerging
Challenges, Working Paper no. 344 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian
National University, 2000), pp. 8–9.
12. Tay and Estanislao, “The Relevance of ASEAN,” p. 19.
13. Jusuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s Past and the Challenges Ahead: Aspects of Politics and Secur-
ity,” in Tay et al., Reinventing ASEAN, p. 30.
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Why Are Some Countries Active/Reluctant?
For the proponents of the conventional/rationalist explanation, it is not sur-
prising that Thailand has advocated changes in ASEAN’s diplomacy.  Bang-
kok was one of the countries that suffered badly as a result of the financial
crisis.  Thus, Bangkok felt the need for ASEAN members to discuss frankly
each other’s domestic matters, including economic policies.  In addition,
Thailand faces the problem of illegal immigrants from Myanmar.  When
Bangkok put forward its proposal for flexible engagement, it was said that
Thailand had been pushing an agenda of greater openness partly because it
had to deal with this problem.14  Moreover, Thailand shares a border with
Cambodia, which is one of the most unstable countries in Southeast Asia.
Thailand’s security can easily be affected by domestic problems in Cambo-
dia.  Therefore, frank discussions of each country’s domestic issues within
ASEAN are valuable for Bangkok.  To be sure, many other ASEAN mem-
bers are facing similar problems.  However, since Thailand shares land bor-
ders with four countries, it is understandable that the government is
particularly concerned about the domestic situations of its neighbors.
While Thailand has advocated changes, many other ASEAN members
have been rather reluctant to modify the interpretation of the non-interference
principle and the ASEAN Way.  Among the original ASEAN members, Indo-
nesia and Malaysia are strong supporters of the strict application of the
ASEAN Way.  A cursory investigation of the situation in the late 1990s
would lead one to wonder why these countries are strong supporters, since
they were the ones most severely affected by the economic disruption in
Bangkok in the late 1990s.  One could have expected that they would be the
first to call for frank discussions of other countries’ domestic matters.  Coun-
tries that were severely affected could have promoted changes more strongly
than Thailand, which had brought about the region-wide economic problem.
In addition, with regard to the haze issue, one could have expected that
Malaysia, which suffered as a result of the domestic Indonesian problem,
would be the strongest advocate for a flexible interpretation of the non-inter-
ference principle.  However, in reality, it was Bangkok, instead of Kuala
Lumpur, which proposed a policy of flexible engagement.  Therefore, one
may point out that the conventional/rationalist explanation cannot account for
the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia have been reluctant to modify the
ASEAN Way of diplomacy, although it can address Thailand’s behaviors.
Proponents of this explanation would not agree with such a claim, main-
taining that they can explain some countries’ reluctance to promote frank
discussions by referring to domestic concerns.  If a country has domestic is-
14. Stephen Powell, “ASEAN Ends Meeting Marked by Free Speech,” Reuters, Manila, July
25, 1998.
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sues the government does not want to expose to international criticism, it
becomes reluctant to promote frank discussions and collective endeavors.
Other countries’ interference might restrict domestic policy options to deal
with such issues, including questions of nation building, human rights, and
democracy.
It is noteworthy that one of the background conditions for the development
of ASEAN’s principle of non-interference was the Southeast Asian countries’
concern over domestic issues.15  Owing to their concern over domestic secur-
ity, their policy priority was to maintain domestic stability.  This was espe-
cially so during the early years of ASEAN, the 1960s and 1970s.  Its mem-
bers’ main security concerns were internal, because the countries were weak
in terms of sociopolitical cohesiveness.16  They obtained independence only
in the mid-20th century, and were at an early stage of consolidation into
nation states.  Domestic uprisings were endemic, and the governments’ prior-
ity was to engage in nation building.17  Against this background, the ASEAN
countries prized the non-interference principle.  They held this principle in
the context of nation building.18  Policies aimed at nation building could con-
travene liberal values such as human rights and democracy.  The non-inter-
ference principle enabled countries to concentrate on domestic matters,
avoiding interference or criticism from other states that would have been an
obstacle to nation building.
Thus, the claim that a country with domestic difficulties tends to be reluc-
tant to modify the interpretation of the non-interference principle is under-
standable.  In contrast, a country with relatively few domestic concerns
should not hesitate to promote a flexible interpretation.  Thailand and the
Philippines, both of which have advocated a flexible interpretation, nowadays
have relatively few domestic problems associated with human rights and de-
mocracy.  This is shown in Freedom in the World, an annual comparative
assessment of political rights (PR)—which enable people to participate freely
in the political process—and civil liberties (CL)—which include the freedom
15. Hiro Katsumata, “Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for
Strict Adherence to the ASEAN Way,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25:1 (April 2003), pp.
104–21.
16. Barry Buzan’s distinction of “strong states” and “weak states” is useful in understanding
the security concerns of ASEAN members.  The principal distinguishing feature of weak states is
their high level of concern over domestically generated threats to the security of the government.
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-
Cold War Era, second edition (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 97–102.
17. See K. S. Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation,” in Asian Security Practice: Mate-
rial and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1998), p. 547; and Muthiah Alagappa, “Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explana-
tions,” in ibid., p. 613.
18. Kraft, The Principle of Non-intervention and ASEAN, p. 2.
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to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state.19
According to the assessment in 1998, the year in which the flexible engage-
ment proposal was put forward, Thailand was graded 2 (PR) and 3 (CL) and
the Philippines was also 2 (PR) and 3 (CL), out of 7, the lowest possible
score.  In contrast, the Southeast Asian countries that have not been eager to
modify the interpretation of the ASEAN Way, including Malaysia and Indo-
nesia, have more problems.  In 1998, Malaysia’s grades were 5 (PR) and 5
(CL); and Indonesia’s ones were 6 (PR) and 4 (CL).  Moreover, the new
ASEAN members in the 1990s have been strong supporters of strict adher-
ence to the ASEAN Way, and they are also burdened with many domestic
issues associated with human rights and democracy.  For example, Vietnam’s
grades were 7 (PR) and 6 (CL); and Myanmar’s ones were 7 (PR) and 7
(CL).
For the proponents of the conventional/rationalist explanation, this ex-
plains why Thailand and the Philippines have not been hesitant to modify the
ASEAN Way, while other countries have been reluctant to change the style
of ASEAN diplomacy.  The differences among the ASEAN countries can be
explained by focusing on their domestic concerns.  Ju¨rgen Haacke argues that
the ASEAN countries, particularly those considered authoritarian, are con-
cerned about the security of their regime; therefore, they are opposed to a
flexible interpretation of the ASEAN Way.20
Limitations
As discussed above, the conventional/rationalist approach can help explain
why the ASEAN countries began to change their diplomatic style in the late
1990s, and why some have promoted change while others have been reluctant
to.  Yet, we should point out some of the limitations of this explanation.  The
behaviors of the actors in Southeast Asia transcend the realm of practical
policies based on instrumental rationality, and thus cannot be seen as mere
attempts to deal efficiently with new challenges like environmental and eco-
nomic issues.  The actors have been discussing frankly issues that do not
require efficient international responses and collective endeavors.  Some of
them have even begun to criticize other ASEAN members’ domestic policies.
These behaviors are related to issues concerning liberal values, such as
human rights and democracy.
For example, in 1998, when Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim was sacked by then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and subse-
19. Freedom House and Adrian Karatnycky, eds., Freedom in the World, 1998–1999: The
Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction, 1999), also
available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>, accessed February 25, 2003.
20. Ju¨rgen Haacke, “ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: A Constructivist Assess-
ment,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 3 (2003), pp. 81, 83.
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quently jailed, the Philippines and Indonesia openly criticized the govern-
ment in Kuala Lumpur.  Criticism by then-Philippine President Joseph
Estrada may have been the first occasion that the head of an ASEAN state
complained directly about human rights violations in a member state.21
Moreover, then-Thai Foreign Minister Surin stated that although the Anwar
issue was Malaysia’s internal problem, it could have far-reaching implica-
tions for ASEAN members.  Surin went so far as to argue that this issue was
hindering the unity of ASEAN.22  Another example is the criticism by Singa-
pore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of then-Indonesian President Suharto’s
choice in 1998 of Jusuf Habibie for vice president.  This was the first direct
criticism of the Indonesian president by the leader of another ASEAN coun-
try.23  Similarly, in February 1999, Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong called on Jakarta to hold elections that would be accepted as fair and
legitimate by the Indonesian people.24
It seems that the conventional/rationalist explanation cannot account for
this liberal aspect of ASEAN diplomacy.  Therefore, the next section takes an
alternative, constructivist perspective, in order to consider actors’ interests as
defined by ideational factors such as norms and values.  Some proponents of
the rationalist explanation may be moved to launch a counter-argument that
their perspective also addresses human rights and democracy.  They may ar-
gue that because the ASEAN countries are worried about their international
reputations and image, they have begun to discuss human rights and democ-
racy and to criticize member countries’ domestic policies.
For example, Kraft mentions the “internationalization” of human rights
norms in the post-Cold War era as one of the reasons behind the Thai propo-
sal to review the non-interference principle.  In addition to the transboundary
implications of the environmental and economic issues, Kraft focuses on the
internationalization of the norms.  The non-interference principle, under
which the Southeast Asian countries did not criticize other members’ human
rights records, had attracted the criticism of Western countries.  ASEAN’s
adherence to non-interference had detrimentally affected the association’s
standing in the international arena.25  Similarly, Haacke argues that the Thai
proposal for flexible engagement should not be regarded as a mere product of
instrumental calculations.  The proposal also illustrated Bangkok’s earnest
21. Amitav Acharya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment,” Asian Survey 39:3 (May/June
1999), p. 430.
22. “Anwar Trial Will Hurt Asean Unity—Surin,” The Nation, Bangkok, November 4, 1998.
23. Acharya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment,” p. 430.
24. Goh Chok Tong, “Speech to the Asia Society,” Sydney, March 2, 1999, quoted in Jeannie
Henderson, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper no. 328 (Oxford: Oxford University Press;
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), p. 53.
25. Kraft, The Principle of Non-intervention and ASEAN, pp. 4–6.
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struggle for international recognition of its democratic credentials.26  Haacke
adds that ASEAN’s diplomatic principles have been relaxed because of the
members’ concerns about ASEAN’s image and reputation, while noting a
global process of norm diffusion in areas such as human rights.27
These authors’ arguments are suggestive, even in the eyes of construc-
tivists.  However, constructivists are not satisfied with the arguments.  This is
because they fail to address the question of why the ASEAN countries are
concerned with their credentials, standings, or reputations in the international
arena, with regard to the issues of human rights and democracy.28  For con-
structivists, this kind of question can only be addressed from their own per-
spective, which focuses on ideational factors shared by actors.  The ASEAN
countries’ behaviors and concerns can only be understood by referring to the
liberal norms shared by actors in Southeast Asia.  As will be argued in the
next section, these actors thought that violation of such norms would damage
ASEAN’s reputation—only because the actors shared, and thus were influ-
enced by, the norms.
Constructivist Explanation
Constructivists focus on the role of ideational factors.  Constructivism con-
siders that actors’ interests can be defined and redefined by ideational factors,
including norms,29 while rationalist IR approaches treat actors’ interests as
exogenously given and fixed.  For constructivists, regional diplomacy in
Southeast Asia has been influenced by a normative shift at the global level
that concerns the relationship between the principle of non-interference and
the norms of human rights and democracy.  In today’s global arena, the divid-
ing line between domestic and international issues is gradually blurring, and
many domestic issues are beginning to have external dimensions.  Such is-
sues concern the norms of human rights and democracy.  In this situation,
26. Ju¨rgen Haacke, “The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Inter-
action: Intramural Challenges to the ‘ASEAN Way’,” Pacific Review 12:4 (1999), p. 588.
27. Haacke, “ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture,” passim, especially pp. 61–62.
28. It is worth noting that, for rationalists, actors may attempt to enhance their reputations for
the sake of material benefits.  Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,”
International Studies Quarterly 32:4 (December 1988), pp. 387–88; David M. Kreps and Robert
Wilson, “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic Theory 27:2 (August
1982), pp. 253–79; and Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps, “Reputation in the Simultaneous
Play of Multiple Opponents,” Review of Economic Studies 54:4 (October 1987), pp. 541–68.
29. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security; Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics; and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Politi-
cal Change,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887–917.  Norms can be
broadly defined as “shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior,” Audie Klotz,
Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1995), p. 14.
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strict application of the principle of non-interference is beginning to seem
irrelevant.  The principle is now being interpreted in a more flexible way.
That is to say, the importance of the principle of non-interference is decreas-
ing, while that of the norms of human rights and democracy is on the in-
crease.
This global normative shift is demonstrated in aspects of international af-
fairs in the post-Cold War era.  The United Nations has been carrying out
operations in various parts of the world under the rubric of humanitarian in-
tervention.  The participants of the Organization/Conference for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/CSCE) have modified their interpretation of
the non-interference principle.  In 1992, the participating states agreed that
issues related to human rights cannot be considered as internal affairs of
states, and are not subject to the principle of non-intervention.30  On the basis
of the notion that in a democracy, sovereignty is vested not in the state, but in
the people, the European countries have considered collective intervention
legitimate.31
ASEAN diplomacy, including its recent change, has been affected by this
normative shift at the global level.  Strict adherence to the non-interference
principle, which let the Southeast Asian countries ignore the domestic affairs
of other members, has been questioned.  Thailand and the Philippines, in-
spired by this shift, have suggested a modified interpretation of the non-inter-
ference principle.  To support these claims, constructivists focus on Bangkok
and Manila.  The foreign-policy makers of the former regime in Bangkok,
which proposed flexible engagement in 1998, strongly supported liberal val-
ues associated with individuals’ rights and freedom.  These policy makers
included then-Foreign Minister Surin and then-Deputy Foreign Minister
Sukhumbhand Paribatra.  These actors had been greatly inspired by the
global normative shift, and thus promoted frank discussion of each ASEAN
member’s domestic affairs.  Surin, when preparing his proposal for a policy
of flexible engagement, maintained that such a policy “was needed for Thai-
land, whose government [respected] an open society, democracy and human
rights.”32  During an interview with a journalist in 1999, Surin said, “My
value of freedom of expression [and] freedom of action is absolute.”33  On
30. Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Helsinki Document 1992: The
Challenges of Change, Helsinki Decisions,” Helsinki, July 9–10, 1992.
31. Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, “Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE,
Norms, and the ‘Construction’ of Security in Post-Cold War Europe,” International Organiza-
tion 53:3 (Summer 1999), pp. 523–28.
32. “Thailand Opposes ASEAN Non-Intervention Policy,” The Nation, Bangkok, June 23,
1998.
33. Dan Sloan, “Thailand Says ASEAN More Optimistic, Open,” Reuters, Singapore, July 25,
1999.
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another occasion, Surin said, “The Thai people should be proud that their
country implements the policy [of frankness and open engagement within
ASEAN], as it clearly reflects a love for democracy, human rights and trans-
parency.”34
It can be said that Thailand is a country that generally values human rights
and democracy.35  When the foreign minister’s proposal for flexible engage-
ment was announced, the Thai people recognized its significance in terms of
liberal values.  The country’s leading scholars and business community wel-
comed their government’s policy as a sign of maturity in conducting a for-
eign policy seeking to promote human rights and democracy.36  The policy
makers of the current regime in Bangkok are relatively modest in terms of the
promotion of liberal values, compared with those of the former regime.37
Yet, the agendas put forward by the former regime still have an impact on
Thai policies and on ASEAN’s diplomacy.
It is also notable that Thailand has been the leading proponent of the notion
of a “People’s ASEAN.”  Since the 1990s, Bangkok has been calling for an
ASEAN people’s forum where issues could be debated and popular sentiment
could be considered.38  This is why, in ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in
1998, Surin stated that ASEAN needed to be “more people-centered” and
responsive to the “aspirations of its peoples.”39  Surin’s view was that the
people in Southeast Asia deserved an “honest and sincere analysis of their
problems.”40  Today, in the ministerial meetings, the ASEAN countries have
begun to employ this notion in the context of human rights and civil society.
The ASEAN ministers have recognized that non-governmental actors should
34. Marisa Chimprabha, “‘Ground Rules’ needed for Interaction,” The Nation, Bangkok, Jan-
uary 5, 1999.
35. Although Bangkok cannot boast an immaculate human rights record, it does appear to be
improving in this area.  Amnesty International (AI) noted in 1999 that Thailand had made sub-
stantial progress toward protecting human rights, while recognizing that further changes were
needed.  Amnesty International, “Thailand: Substantial Human Rights Progress Made,” January
5, 1999, AI Index: ASA 39/002/1999, available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/EN-
GASA390021999>, accessed February 12, 2004.
36. “Thailand’s ASEAN Move Welcomed,” The Nation, Bangkok, August 4, 1998.
37. The Thai Foreign Minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, noted in February 2001 that the new
government’s foreign policy toward Myanmar would be governed by the “Asian way” of non-
interference.  A Thai newspaper, The Nation, observed that this was Surakiart’s attempt to dilute
the flexible-engagement policy implemented by the last government.  “‘Asian Way’ the New
Way, Says Surakiart,” The Nation, Bangkok, February 28, 2001.
38. barry wain, “outgrowing the ASEAN way,” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1998,
p. 12.
39. Surin Pitsuwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, “Opening Statement” at the 31st
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, July 24, 1998.
40. Sloan, “Thailand Says ASEAN More Optimistic,” Reuters, Singapore, July 25, 1999.
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be involved in the discussion of human rights in the “broader context of a
People’s ASEAN.”41
The Philippines’ support for a flexible interpretation of the non-interfer-
ence principle is understandable too.  This is because the Manila government
views its republic as a “Western democratic” country respecting human
rights.42  Manila has always been concerned about ASEAN’s international
image.43  Thus, it supported the Thai proposal because ASEAN’s failure to
address human rights issues would have damaged the association’s interna-
tional reputation.  In addition to the policy makers of these two countries,
many actors in Southeast Asia have been influenced by the global normative
shift.  The degree of influence may vary, but many actors have been attentive
to the global discourse on human rights and democracy.  This is why there
have been many cases in which the domestic policies of an ASEAN member
were criticized by other members in this context.
Why in the Late 1990s?
The constructivist explanation presented above can address the question of
why ASEAN began to change in the late 1990s.  ASEAN has faced criticism
from the countries of North America and Europe for admitting Myanmar,
ruled by a military regime, in 1997 as a member. For the ASEAN countries
that supported liberal values associated with human rights and democracy—
notably, Thailand and the Philippines, this situation was undesirable.  Actors
there thought that the Myanmar issue could damage ASEAN’s international
image, reputation, and legitimacy.44  This is one of the important reasons
why it was in the late 1990s that these two countries called for frank discus-
sions of domestic issues.45  As then-Thai Deputy Foreign Minister
Sukhumbhand stated, “It is essential that members do their utmost to make
themselves acceptable in the eyes of the international community.”46
In addition, for constructivists, the impact of the Asian financial crisis
should not be ignored.  The crisis was a shock external to the ASEAN coun-
tries’ practice of their diplomatic norms, including non-interference.  For
constructivists, such an external shock may have a massive impact on
41. ASEAN, “Joint Communique´, the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,” Hanoi, July 23–24,
2001.
42. Author’s interview with an anonymous official of the Philippine Foreign Ministry, May
2002.
43. Ibid.
44. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that a combination of the actors’ desires to enhance their
international legitimation and self-esteem and pressure for conformity drive many of them to
adopt norms.  See Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” pp. 895, 902–04.
45. For Bangkok’s concern about its democratic credentials, see Haacke, “The Concept of
Flexible Engagement,” pp. 587–89.
46. “ASEAN Urged to Become More Open to Change,” The Nation, Bangkok, June 22, 2000.
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norms,47 and the crisis had a great impact on the Southeast Asian countries’
practice of the ASEAN Way.  As a result of this shock, they began to think
that the principle of non-interference could be interpreted in a more flexible
way, given that this principle was valueless in the face of the financial crisis.
Why Are Some Countries Active/Reluctant?
The constructivist explanation can also address the question of why Thailand
and the Philippines have advocated a flexible interpretation of the non-inter-
ference principle, while other ASEAN members have been reluctant to mod-
ify the ASEAN Way.  A constructivist answer to this issue has been sug-
gested already.  The policy makers of those two countries support liberal val-
ues associated with human rights and democracy.  They have been strongly
inspired by the global normative shift.
Among ASEAN members, Thailand and the Philippines have been rela-
tively distinct, if not politically Western.  Since the Cold War era, they have
maintained strong defense ties with the U.S., although ASEAN as a whole
declared its neutralist stance in 1971 by introducing its plan for the Zone of
Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality.48  In this respect, the fact that Bangkok and
Manila were more influenced by the global normative shift than the rest of
the ASEAN members is not surprising.  One of the cases that demonstrate
these countries’ adherence to liberal values is their response to the East Ti-
mor issue.  In the global debate over the international response to the East
Timor crisis in 1999, Thailand and the Philippines were the ASEAN nations
most sympathetic to some form of humanitarian intervention.49
In contrast, other ASEAN members are relatively passive on the issue of
liberal values, and less influenced by the global normative shift.  Thus, they
are rather reluctant to promote a flexible interpretation of ASEAN norms and
frank discussions of domestic issues.  Since their policy makers are not strong
supporters of liberal values, they do not hesitate to express their disagreement
with a plan to promote a flexible interpretation of the non-interference princi-
ple.  They say that discussions of the issues of human rights and democracy
are undesirable and premature.  When Bangkok put forward its proposal,
then-Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas expressed his disagreement:
47. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Re-
prise,” in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein, pp. 473, 488.
48. ASEAN, “Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration,” Manila, November 27,
1971.
49. Derek McDougall, “Regional Institutions and Security: Implications of the 1999 East Ti-
mor Crisis,” in Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, eds. Andrew T. H. Tan and J.
D. Kenneth Boutin (Singapore: Select Publishing; Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
2001), p. 176.  Some ASEAN countries, including these two, contributed a limited number of
personnel to the international force led by Australia.
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“The principle of non-interference is a very basic principle . . . [W]e can talk
about certain problems like transnational crimes, but if you start talking
[about] how a country must run affairs like . . . democratizing, or . . . human
rights, then you are getting into trouble.”50
Former Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi maintained
that an attempt to abandon the “time-honoured principle” of non-interference
would set ASEAN on the “path towards eventual disintegration.”51
Conclusions
In an attempt to address the question of why ASEAN diplomacy has been
changing, this study has considered the merits of two different explanations.
The conventional/rationalist explanation holds that the recent change is
ASEAN’s attempt to deal with new challenges in an efficient manner.  The
new challenges, such as environmental, economic, and societal issues, require
an efficient multilateral response, and thus, the ASEAN countries have been
discussing them in an open and frank manner.  This line of explanation can
address the question of why it was in the late 1990s that ASEAN diplomacy
began to change.  The Southeast Asian countries faced two major challenges
in the late 1990s: the Asian financial crisis and the haze problem.  Efficient
responses to these challenges would require collective endeavors, which may
involve discussions of each country’s domestic issues.
This explanation can also address the question of why some countries have
advocated changes in ASEAN’s diplomacy, while others are reluctant to
modify the interpretation of the ASEAN Way.  Thailand is one of the coun-
tries that was severely affected by the financial crisis.  It shares land borders
with Myanmar and Cambodia, both of which are relatively unstable politi-
cally.  Therefore, Thailand called for frank discussion of domestic issues.  In
addition, this explanation holds that countries with domestic problems that
the government does not want to expose to international criticism tend to be
reluctant to promote frank discussions, while countries with relatively few
domestic concerns do not hesitate to promote a flexible interpretation of the
non-interference principle.  Indonesia is an example of the former category,
and Thailand of the latter.
However, this conventional/rationalist explanation has some limitations.
The behaviors of the ASEAN countries transcend the realm of practical poli-
cies.  They have been engaged in frank discussions of issues that do not re-
50. Stephen Powell, “ASEAN in Unprecedented Openness Debate—Philippines,” Reuters,
Manila, July 24, 1998.
51. Stephen Powell, “ASEAN Debate on Democracy, Human Rights Hots Up,” ibid., July 26,
1998.
\\server05\productn\A\ASR\44-2\ASR202.txt unknown Seq: 16 28-APR-04 10:11
252 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2004
quire efficient international responses, such as those associated with human
rights and democracy.
Given that the rationalist explanation cannot grasp this aspect of ASEAN
diplomacy, this article has offered an alternative.  The constructivist explana-
tion holds that ASEAN’s diplomacy has been affected by the global norma-
tive shift.  In today’s global arena, the importance of the principle of non-
interference is decreasing, while that of the norms of human rights and de-
mocracy is on the increase.  Inspired by this normative shift, actors in Thai-
land and the Philippines have suggested a modified interpretation of the non-
interference principle.  The policy makers of these two countries support lib-
eral values associated with human rights and democracy, and have been
greatly inspired by the global normative shift.  In contrast, many other
ASEAN countries are passive with regard to the promotion of liberal values,
and are reluctant to modify the ASEAN Way of diplomacy.  Hence, the con-
structivist explanation can address the question of why Bangkok and Manila
have called for changes, while other countries have not.
Furthermore, this explanation can also address the issues of why it was in
the late 1990s that ASEAN diplomacy began to change.  For the ASEAN
countries that support liberal values, the association’s admission of Myanmar
could have damaged the international image and reputation of ASEAN.  This
explains why Bangkok and Manila called for frank discussions of domestic
issues.  In addition, the Asian financial crisis served as an external shock, and
had a great impact on the Southeast Asian countries’ practice of the ASEAN
Way.
Eclectic View?
The discussion in this article, summarized above, suggests that the construc-
tivist explanation is sounder than the conventional/rationalist explanation.
However, it may be that the question of which line of explanation is superior
is not as important as one might assume.  IR theorists tend to focus on the
strengths and weaknesses of various IR perspectives.  Disagreement between
rationalists and constructivists constitutes the core of scholarly debate in to-
day’s IR.  However, Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara argue that re-
searchers should be disabused of the notion that scholarship is about
paradigmatic clashes, rather than disciplined analysis of empirical puzzles.52
Hence, for these authors, an approach-driven analysis should give place to
problem-driven research.53
52. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case for
Analytical Eclecticism,” International Security 26:3 (Winter 2001/02), p. 154.
53. Ibid., p. 183.
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The two explanations offered in this paper can grasp two different aspects
of ASEAN diplomacy.  It seems that both of these two aspects are relevant.
Attempts to judge the superiority of one explanation and to rule out the value
of the other may lead one to ignore an important aspect of ASEAN politics.
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to explore the possibilities of an eclectic
view.  For a full understanding of the change in ASEAN diplomacy, it may
be reasonable to take some elements of both the conventional/rationalist and
constructivist views into account.54
There are a number of cases in which the elements of the two different
accounts offered in this paper do not contradict each other.  When they are
not contradictory, researchers may explore the possibilities of an eclectic
view for a complete understanding of the case.  For the question of why it
was in the late 1990s that ASEAN diplomacy began to change, both the con-
ventional/rationalist and constructivist explanations consider the impact of
the financial crisis.  These two explanations differ about the impact the eco-
nomic crisis had on international politics; however, they do not contradict
each other.  The former holds that the crisis made the countries in the region
aware that this kind of new challenge would require collective efforts that
might involve discussions of domestic issues.  The latter holds that the crisis
was a shock that made the ASEAN countries think the non-interference prin-
ciple might be inappropriate.
Moreover, an eclectic account may be useful in exploring the question of
why Thailand and the Philippines called for a flexible interpretation of the
non-interference principle.  For proponents of the conventional/rationalist ex-
planation, Bangkok and Manila felt the need for ASEAN to be able to deal
with a variety of new challenges, such as environmental problems, financial
crises, and illegal migration, which would require collective, efficient re-
sponses.  For constructivists, these countries were inspired by the global nor-
mative shift, and thus believe that the issues of human rights and democracy
should be addressed in ASEAN.  These different interpretations need not be
considered contradictory, and a country can take account of both at the same
time.
Some proponents of the conventional/rationalist explanation add that the
motive behind Bangkok’s proposal included its concern about ASEAN’s in-
ternational reputation with regard to the issues of human rights and democ-
racy.  Yet, these scholars do not offer a satisfactory account of the sources of
Bangkok’s concern.  This is where constructivists, focusing on ideational fac-
tors, may assist rationalists.  When rationalism fails to offer a full account,
constructivism can complement it by identifying the sources of actors’ inter-
54. In this regard, Katzenstein and Okawara argue that analytical eclecticism is well-suited to
capturing the truth of Asia-Pacific affairs.  Ibid., passim, especially p. 178 (citation 91).
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ests.55  For constructivists, Bangkok’s concern can be explained in terms of
liberal values and norms.  An eclectic view can even accommodate this kind
of complementary relationship between two approaches.
As described above, many elements of the conventional/rationalist expla-
nation and those of the constructivist account do not contradict each other.
For a complete understanding of the situation, an eclectic view may be use-
ful.  In today’s ASEAN diplomacy, it can be said that elements of both the
rationalist and constructivist interpretations are intertwined.
55. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical
Weapons Taboos,” in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein, p. 152; and
Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” p. 496.
